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To investigate the mechanisms through which eco-
nomic decisions are formed, I examined the activity
of neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex while monkeys
chose between different juice types. Different clas-
ses of cells encoded the value of individual offers
(offer value), the value of the chosen option (chosen
value), or the identity of the chosen juice (chosen
juice). Choice variability was partly explained by the
tendency to repeat choices (choice hysteresis).
Surprisingly, near-indifference decisions did not
reflect fluctuations in the activity of offer value cells.
In contrast, near-indifference decisions correlated
with fluctuations in the preoffer activity of chosen
juice cells. After the offer, the activity of chosen juice
cells reflected the decision difficulty but did not
resemble a race-to-threshold. Finally, chosen value
cells presented an ‘‘activity overshooting’’ closely
related to the decision difficulty and possibly due to
fluctuations in the relative value of the juices. This
overshooting was independent of choice hysteresis.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, significant progress has been made in under-
standing the neural underpinnings of economic choices. In
particular, much work has focused on the computation and rep-
resentation of subjective values. Lesion studies have shown that
value-based decisions are selectively disrupted after lesions to
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and/or the amygdala, but effec-
tively spared after lesions to other brain regions (Buckley et al.,
2009; Camille et al., 2011; Gallagher et al., 1999; Rudebeck
and Murray, 2011; West et al., 2011). Neurophysiology experi-
ments have found that neurons in the primate OFC encode the
subjective value of different goods during economic decisions
and integrate multiple dimensions on which goods can vary
(Kennerley et al., 2009; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006;
Roesch and Olson, 2005). Functional imaging in humans has
consistently confirmed and extended these results (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007; Levy et al., 2010; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009;1322 Neuron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Plassmann et al., 2007). But in spite of these advances, funda-
mental questions remain open. Perhaps most pressingly, the
precisemechanisms through which values are compared remain
unclear. In this respect, OFC appears particularly noteworthy. In
a computational sense, an economic decision is a process
through which the values of different goods are compared and
one good is eventually chosen. Studies in which monkeys chose
between different juice types have shown that neurons in the
OFC encode three variables: offer value (the value of individual
goods, independent of the eventual choice), chosen value (the
value of the chosen good, independent of its identity), and
chosen juice (the identity of the chosen good, independent of
its value) (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008). OFC thus
appears to represent all the components of the decision pro-
cess, suggesting that closer examination of activity in this area
might shed light on key aspects of economic choice.
In the effort to unravel the neuronal mechanisms of economic
decisions, it could be fruitful to establish ananalogybetweeneco-
nomic decisions and other behaviors frequently examined in
neurophysiology (Sugrue et al., 2005). In particular, extensive
research has focused on the decision process underlying the
visual perception of motion (henceforth ‘‘perceptual decisions’’).
In a somewhat simplified account, two brain areas play a critical
role. Neurons in the middle temporal (MT) area encode the direc-
tion of motion for the stimuli present in the visual scene at any
given time. In contrast, neurons in the lateral intraparietal (LIP)
area encode the binary result of the decision process.When stim-
uli are degraded such that the decision process stretches over
longer periods of time, neurons in MT encode the instantaneous
evidence fromthevisual stimuli,withnomemory. Incontrast, neu-
rons in LIP encode the accumulated evidence in favor of one
particular decision (Newsome, 1997; Shadlen et al., 1996).
Tracing the analogy between economic and perceptual deci-
sions, offer value cells in OFC may correspond to neurons in
MT, whereas chosen juice may correspond to neurons in LIP.
Indeed, the former seem to represent the main input to the deci-
sion process, whereas the latter seem to represent the binary
outcome of the decision. In contrast, chosen value cells in OFC
donot appear to have a clear counterpart in perceptual decisions.
The analogy with perceptual decisions highlights two funda-
mental and open issues in economic decision-making. First,
extensive work on perceptual decisions has been devoted
to understanding how fluctuations in the activity of dif-
ferent neuronal populations contribute to decisions near the
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near-indifference decisions are mildly, but significantly, corre-
lated with activity fluctuations in area MT (Britten et al., 1996;
Cohen and Newsome, 2009) has provided a critical link between
this area and the perception of motion. In contrast, the neuronal
origins of variability in economic choices have not yet been
examined, and we do not yet understand what drives decisions
near the indifference point. Second, the time necessary to reach
either a perceptual or an economic decision depends on the
decision difficulty (Padoa-Schioppa et al., 2006; Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002; Soltani et al., 2012). Building on this notion,
much research has focused on neuronal activity reflecting the
formation of a perceptual decision over time. In particular, the
activity of neurons in LIP was found to increase gradually during
perceptual decisions, suggesting that these cells encode the
evolving decision state of the animal (Roitman and Shadlen,
2002; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). By comparison, less is
known about how economic decisions form over time, or about
how economic decisions depend on the decision difficulty.
In addition to these empirical questions, considerable work
on perceptual decisions has been devoted to mathematical
conceptualization. Specifically, activity profiles in area LIP
have been described with a variety of models, including race-
to-threshold processes and dynamical systems (Bogacz et al.,
2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Wang, 2002). In contrast,
although several proposals were recently put forth (Hunt et al.,
2012; Krajbich et al., 2010; Soltani et al., 2012; Solway and Bot-
vinick, 2012), a comprehensive model for the neuronal mecha-
nisms of economic decisions remains elusive (see Discussion).
To address these issues and gather elements that would inform
future models, I examined data recorded in the OFC of monkeys
engaged in economic choices.
RESULTS
Neuronal activity in OFCwas recorded in two experiments during
which monkeys chose between different juice types (see Exper-
imental Procedures). In experiment 1, animals chose between
two juices labeled A and B, with A preferred (Padoa-Schioppa
and Assad, 2006). Offers were represented by sets of colored
squares on a computer monitor and the animals indicated their
choices with an eye movement. Juice quantities varied from trial
to trial and behavioral choice patterns typically presented a qual-
ity-quantity trade-off (Figures 1A and 1B). In experiment 2, the
procedures were very similar except that three juices were
used in each session (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008). Two
of the three juices were offered in each trial, with the three juice
pairs randomly interleaved.
From Neuronal Responses to Cell Classes
Previous analyses were based on neuronal responses, defined
as the activity of one cell in one time window (see Experimental
Procedures). It was shown that the vast majority of neuronal re-
sponses encoded one of three variables: offer value (Figure 1C),
chosen value (Figure 1D), and chosen juice (Figure 1E). Notably,
the firing rate could increase or decrease as a function of the
encoded variable (positive or negative encoding). However,
two important questions were not previously addressed. First,Nbecause variables offer value, chosen value and chosen juice
were intrinsically correlated, individual responses were often
explained bymore than one variable. For example, one response
could have a nonzero slope when regressed onto either offer
value or chosen value. In such case, the response was assigned
to the variable with the highest R2. However, this criterion did not
assess whether offer value and chosen value were distinct
classes of responses or, alternatively, whether the two variables
represented ‘‘poles’’ of a continuum. Second, previous studies
did not test whether offer value, chosen value, and chosen
juice corresponded to separate groups of cells. In principle,
any given neuron could encode different variables at different
times. Alternatively, each cell could consistently encode a single
variable. I addressed these issues as follows.
To assess whether offer value and chosen value are distinct
classes of responses, I computed for each response the linear
regression onto variables offer value and chosen value, from
which I obtained the two R2. I then defined DR2 = R2offer value –
R2chosen value, which ranged from 1 to +1. For a response
perfectly explained by offer value (chosen value) and poorly ex-
plained by chosen value (offer value), DR2 is close to +1 (1). If
offer value and chosen value are two poles of a continuum, the
distribution of DR2 should be unimodal with a peak close to
zero. Conversely, if offer value and chosen value are distinct clas-
ses of responses, the distribution of DR2 should be bimodal with
a dip close to zero. As illustrated in Figures 1F and 1G, the distri-
bution obtained forDR2was indeed bimodal (p < 0.02, Hartigan’s
dip test). Thus, offer value and chosen value appeared to be
distinct classes of responses. I repeated this analysis for the
two other pairs of variables (offer value versus chosen juice
and chosen value versus chosen juice). In both cases, the distri-
bution for DR2 was clearly bimodal (both p < 1010, Hartigan’s
dip test; Figures 1H–1K). In conclusion, offer value, chosen value,
and chosen juice responses are best thought of as different
classes of responses, not as poles of a continuum.
To assess whether different neurons encoded different
variables, I first examined data from experiment 1. Neuronal re-
sponses were classified as encoding one of four variables: offer
value A, offer value B, chosen value, or chosen juice. Responses
that were not task-related or that were not explained by any var-
iable were unclassified. Given a neuron and two time windows, I
defined a ‘‘classification conflict’’ if the neuron was classified in
both time windows but it encoded different variables. A conflict
was also detected if a cell encoded the same variable but with
different sign. I thus sought to establish whether the incidence
of classification conflicts in the populationwas greater, compara-
ble, or lower than expected by chance. Chance level was
estimated with a bootstrap technique (see Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures available online). This analysis showed that
the number of classification conflicts present in the data was
significantly lower than expectedby chance (p < 1010, t test; Fig-
ure S1A). Conversely, for each pair of time windows, cells with
consistent classificationwere significantlymore frequent thanex-
pected by chance (Figure S1B; all p < 1010, t test). Data from
experiment 2 provided very similar results both for the analysis
of classification conflicts (p < 1010, t test) and for that of classifi-
cation consistency (all p < 1010, t test). In other words, OFC neu-
rons typically encoded the same variable across time windows.euron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 1323
Figure 1. Categorical Encoding of Offer Value, Chosen Value, and Chosen Juice
(A) Task design. Animals maintained center fixation and offers were represented by two sets of color squares. After a randomly variable delay, animals indicated
their choice with a saccade.
(B) Typical choice pattern. The x axis represents offer types ranked by the ratio #B:#A. The y axis represents the percentage of trials in which the animal chose
juice B. In this session, the animal was roughly indifferent between 1A and 4B.
(legend continued on next page)
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iable that best explained responses across all time windows
(sum of R2 across time windows), taking into account the sign
of the encoding. The resulting data set included 245 offer value
cells (188/57 with positive/negative encoding), 273 chosen value
cells (161/112 with positive/negative encoding), and 265 chosen
juice cells. The sign of chosen juice cells could be assessed un-
equivocally only for data from experiment 2 (146 chosen juice
cells, 96/50 with positive/negative encoding). Unless otherwise
specified, all the analyses of chosen juice cells were performed
by pooling data from the two experiments and rectifying cells
with negative encoding such that the ‘‘encoded’’ juice elicited
higher neuronal activity.
Figure 2 illustrates the average activity profile obtained for
each neuronal population. Importantly, inspection of Figure 2E
suggests that decisions were made within 500 ms of the offer.
Computational Framework
Consider a session in which the animal chose between juice A
and juice B. When the two offer values were sufficiently different,
the animal consistently chose the same juice. However, near-
indifference decisions were typically split: on some trials the
animal chose juice A, in other trials it chose juice B. This phenom-
enon is referred to as choice variability (Figure 3A). The primary
goal of this study was to shed light on the neuronal origins of
choice variability.
The analyses presented here were guided by the computa-
tional framework depicted in Figure 3B (see also Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011). At the outset of this study, I conceptualized
the decision between two goods as a process in which two offer
values are compared on the basis of a relative value. The deci-
sion outcome is represented by the identity and value of the
chosen good. The three populations of neurons found in the
OFC appear to match this scheme. Indeed, offer value cells
encode the value of individual offers, whereas chosen value
and chosen juice cells encode, respectively, the value and iden-
tity of the chosen good. This observation led to the working hy-
pothesis that motivated this study, namely that each class of
cells in the OFC may be identified with the corresponding
computation.
Choice Hysteresis
Choice patterns in the experiments were generally saturated,
indicating that the animals had strict preferences. However,
when the two offers had similar values, monkeys were more
likely to choose the same juice that they had chosen in the pre-
vious trial. I refer to this behavioral phenomenon as ‘‘choice hys-(C) Response encoding the offer value. Black symbols represent the behavioral ch
after the offer. Each data point represents one trial type and diamonds and circles r
bars represent SE.
(D) Response encoding the chosen value. Color symbols represent the firing rate
(E) Response encoding the chosen juice. Color symbols represent the firing rate
(F and G) Categorical encoding of offer value versus chosen value. The scatter plo
offer value or the chosen value. For each response, I considered the two R2s ob
(F) The two R2s are plotted against each other. (G) Illustrates the distribution obt
(H and I) Offer value versus chosen juice.
(J and K) Chosen value versus chosen juice.
See also Figure S1.
Nteresis.’’ One example session is illustrated in Figure 4A, where I
separated trials into two groups depending on the outcome of
the previous trial. The choice pattern obtained when the
outcome of the previous trial was juice A (trials A,) was displaced
to the right (higher indifference point) compared to the choice
pattern obtained when the outcome of the previous trial was
juice B (trials B,). Choice hysteresis was consistent across ses-
sions (Figure 4B). The indifference point measured in A, trials
was typically higher than that measured in B, trials (p < 1010,
sign test). In some cases, the outcome of the previous trial was
neither juice A nor juice B. These trials (X, trials) followed incom-
plete trials or, in experiment 2, trials in which the animal chose
the third juice offered in the session. The indifference point
measured in X, trials was typically between those obtained for
A, trials and B, trials. Importantly, choice hysteresis largely
dissipated after one trial (Figure 4C).
To quantify choice hysteresis more precisely, I used a logistic
analysis. I constructed the following logistic model:
choice B= 1=ð1+ eXÞ
X= a0 + a1 logð#B=#AÞ+ a2ðdn1;B  dn1;AÞ: (Equation 1)
The variable choice Bwas equal to 1 if the animal chose juice B
and 0 otherwise. #A and #B were, respectively, the quantities of
juices A and B offered to the animal in any given trial. The current
trial was referred to as trial n and the variable dn-1, J was equal to 1
if in the previous trial the animal received juice J and 0 otherwise.
Note that the difference (dn-1, B  dn-1, A) was equal to 1, 1, or
0 depending on whether the previous trial ended with receipt
of juice B, juice A, or otherwise (e.g., with receipt of the third juice
in experiment 2). The logistic regression provided an estimate for
parameters a0, a1, and a2. By construction, a1 > 0. In the simpli-
fied model with a2 = 0, a1 was the inverse temperature and a
measure of choice variability, whereas the indifference point
was provided by exp(a0/a1). Choice hysteresis corresponded
to a2 > 0. However, it was useful to quantify the effect of choice
hysteresis with the normalized coefficient a2/a1. This logistic
regression was performed for each session in the data set (304
sessions total). I thus obtained a distribution for a2/a1 across
sessions (Figure 4D). The median of the distribution m = 0.124
was significantly >0 (p < 1010, Wilcoxon sign test). Behaviorally,
this means that the effect of obtaining juice B in the previous trial
was equivalent to multiplying the quantity of juice B by a factor of
exp(m)z1.13.
In subsequent analyses, I examined the contributions of
different neuronal populations to choice variability while control-
ling for choice hysteresis.oice pattern and green symbols represent the firing rate recorded in the 500ms
epresent, respectively, trials in which the animal chose juice A and juice B. Error
recorded in the 500 ms after the offer.
recorded in the 500 ms before juice delivery.
t and the histogram include all the responses classified as encoding either the
tained from linear regressions against variables offer value and chosen value.
ained for DR2.
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Figure 2. Average Activity Profiles
(A and B) Average population activity for offer value cells. For each cell, trials were divided into three tertiles based on the value of the encoded juice (high,
medium, and low). The activity of each tertile was averaged across the population. (A) and (B) show the activity for neurons with positive/negative encoding
(188/57 cells).
(C andD) Average population activity for chosen value cells. For each cell, trials were divided into three tertiles based on the chosen value (high, medium, and low).
(C) and (D) show the activity for neurons with positive/negative encoding (161/112 cells).
(E and F) Average population activity for chosen juice cells. The figure includes only data from experiment 2, for which positive/negative encoding could be
established (see main text). For each chosen juice cell, trials were divided depending on whether the animal chose the juice encoded by the cell (E chosen) or the
other juice (O chosen). (E) and (F) show the average activity for neurons with positive/negative encoding (96/50 cells).
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Explain Choice Variability
In the framework of Figure 3B, offer value cells (Figure 1C) repre-
sent the primary input to the decision process. Intuitively and by1326 Neuron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.analogy with results in perceptual decisions, it is reasonable to
wonder whether choice variability reflects fluctuations in the ac-
tivity of offer value cells. To examine this issue, I analyzed all offer
value cells focusing on offer types for which decisions were split.
Figure 3. Computational Framework
(A) Choice variability (cartoon). Consider a session in which the animal chose
between juice A and juice B. The experimental design and the analysis
assumed that, for each offer type, the percent of B choices (black dots) de-
pended only on the ratio #B:#A. Choice variability corresponds to the fact that
the normal distribution derived from the sigmoid fit has nonzero variance. The
mean of the distribution is the indifference point.
(B) Computational framework. The decision model proposed here assumes
that there is an input layer represented by offer value cells. The input feeds into
a circuit that includes chosen juice neurons and chosen value neurons, which
collectively represent the choice outcome. This computational framework
does not specify the architecture of the network, and is thus compatible with a
variety of possible architectures (Bogacz et al., 2006). The relative value be-
tween the two goods (r) can generally be thought of as a ratio of synaptic
efficacies. For example, in a mutual-inhibition model or in a pooled-inhibition
model, the input units (offer value cells) feed into response units (chosen juice
cells) with synaptic efficacies rA and rB. In this scenario and under reasonable
assumptions, the relative value r equals the ratio rA/rB. Alternatively, in a
pooled-inhibition model, r s 1 could also emerge from an imbalance of the
other synaptic efficacies defined in the network. In principle, synaptic effi-
cacies (and their ratios) can fluctuate stochastically on a trial-by-trial basis.
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neuron under consideration (juice E), whereas in other trials
the animal chose the other juice (juice O). For each offer type,
the firing rate was averaged separately for the two groups of tri-
als. The resulting traces were averaged across offer types to
obtain two traces for each offer value cell: one for trials in which
the animal chose the encoded juice (E chosen) and another for
trials in which the animal chose the other juice (O chosen). These
traces were baseline-subtracted and averaged across neurons.
As illustrated in Figure 5A (positive encoding), the resulting
population traces appeared indistinguishable throughout the
1 s following the offer. A receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) (see Experimental Procedures) analysis focused on the
150–400 ms after the offer confirmed this impression. Specif-
ically, the area under the curve (AUC; also referred to as choice
probability) did not consistently differ from the null hypothesis of
0.5 (mean AUC = 0.504; p = 0.6, t test). Thus there was no evi-
dence that the activity of offer value cells was elevated on trials
in which the animal chose the juice they encoded. Similar results
were obtained for negative encoding cells (Figure 5B) and in
several different variants of this analysis (Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures; Figure S2).
To further test the possible relationship between fluctuations
in the activity of offer value cells and near-indifference decisions,
I ran a logistic analysis using an approach similar to that of Yang
and Shadlen (2007). This analysis focused on the 500 ms
following the offer. I constructed the following logistic model:Nchoice E= 1=ð1+ eXÞ
X= a0 + a1 logð#E=#OÞ+ a2ðdn1;E  dn1;OÞ+ a3 4residual:(Equation 2)
For each offer value cell, E was the juice encoded by the cell, O
was the other juice, and 4residual was the residual firing rate re-
maining after the linear regression of the raw firing rate (4) onto
the variable offer value E. Other notations were as in Equation 1.
The null hypothesis corresponded to a3/a1 = 0. The logistic
regression was performed for each offer value cell in the data
set (cells from experiment 2 contributed each with two data
points). Figure S5B illustrates the distribution for a3/a1 obtained
across the population. In this histogram, cells with positive and
negative encoding were pooled after inverting the sign of a3 for
cells with negative encoding. The median of the distribution
m = 0.001 was in the expected direction but did not reach statis-
tical significance (p = 0.12, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
In summary, I did not find consistent evidence that near-indif-
ference decisions correlate with stochastic fluctuations in the
activity of offer value cells. This result is somewhat surprising
and qualitatively different from observations on perceptual
decisions (see Discussion).
Chosen Juice Cells, Decision Difficulty, and Predictive
Activity
I next examined chosen juice cells (Figure 1E). By definition, the
activity of these neurons depended on the type of juice the animal
chose, but not on its value. One important question was whether
and how their activity depended on the decision difficulty. To
address this issue, I pooled cells from the two experiments and
rectified neurons such that the encoded juice was defined as
thatwhich elicited higher activity. For each cell, I divided trials de-
pending onwhether themonkey chose the encoded juice (juice E)
or the other juice (juice O) and on whether decisions for that offer
type were easy or split (see Experimental Procedures). I thus ob-
tained four groups of trials: ‘‘E chosen easy,’’ ‘‘E chosen split,’’
‘‘O chosen split,’’ and ‘‘O chosen easy.’’ For each group, I aver-
aged theactivity profiles across trials andacross cells (Figure 6A).
Several aspects of the results are noteworthy.
First, even though the encoding was basically binary (high or
low depending on the chosen juice), the activity profile clearly
depended on the decision difficulty. In particular, consider trials
in which the monkey chose the encoded juice (blue lines in Fig-
ure 6A). In the time window 200–450 ms following the offer, the
activity was significantly higher for easy decisions than for split
decisions (ROC analysis: across the population, mean AUC =
0.556; p < 1010, t test). Conversely, for trials in which the animal
chose the other juice (red lines in Figure 6A), the drop of activity in
the same time window was significantly more pronounced when
decisions were easy than when they were split (mean AUC =
0.477; p < 104, t test).
Second, the activity of chosen juice cells did not resemble a
race-to-threshold. Indeed, although the traces for easy and split
decisions converged, they did so 500 ms after the offer for E
trials and, most strikingly, well into the descent phase that
followed the activity peak. In this respect, there appears to be
a difference between chosen juice cells in OFC and neurons in
LIP (but see Discussion).euron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 1327
Figure 4. Choice Hysteresis
(A) Choice hysteresis in one example session.
Trials were separated into two groups depending
on the outcome of the previous trial. The choice
pattern obtained when the outcome of the previ-
ous trial was juice A (trials A,, dark gray) was dis-
placed to the right (higher indifference point)
compared to the choice pattern obtained when the
outcome of the previous trial was juice B (trials B,,
light gray).
(B) Choice hysteresis across sessions. Each data
point corresponds to one juice pair in one session,
and the two axes indicate the indifference point
measured in A, trials (x axis) and B, trials (y axis).
Arrows point to the session shown in (A) (gray
circle).
(C) Choice hysteresis largely dissipated within one
trial. The panel compares AA, trials and BA, trials.
(D) Logistic analysis. The x axis represents the ratio
a2/a1 defined in Equation 1, the y axis represents
the number of session (304 total).
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500 ms preceding the offer. The activity profiles recorded
when decisions were easy (dark blue and dark red in Figure 6A)
were essentially indistinguishable, consistent with the intuition
that the animal could not have made a decision before the offer.
However, the activity profiles recorded when decisions were
split (light blue and light red lines in Figure 6A) seemed to defy
this intuition. Indeed, the activity preceding choices of the
encoded juice was clearly higher than that preceding choices
of the other juice. By analogy with effects observed in other
behavioral tasks (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Williams et al.,
2003; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009), I refer to this as ‘‘predic-
tive activity.’’ In the framework of Figure 3B, a possible interpre-
tation of the predictive activity is that trial-by-trial fluctuations in
the initial state of the neuronal assembly, reflected in the activity
of chosen juice cells, contributed to the decision of the animal. In
this view, when one of the two offer values clearly dominated, the
initial state was irrelevant: animals always chose the dominant
offer. However, near the indifference point, when there was no
clearly dominant offer, relatively small fluctuations in the initial
state effectively biased the decision. (More specific hypotheses
are discussed below.)
It was important to assess whether predictive activity was
generally present in individual cells. To examine this issue, I per-
formed an ROC analysis focused on the 500 ms before the offer.
For each cell, I identified offer types in which decisions were split,
and I divided trials into twogroupsdepending on thechosen juice.1328 Neuron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Comparing the two distributions of firing
rates, I measured the AUC. Across the
population, the mean AUC significantly
exceeded the null hypothesis of 0.5
(mean AUC = 0.527, p < 106, t test), indi-
cating that predictive activity was typically
present in individual chosen juice cells.
One possible concern was whether the
activity of chosen juice cells was genu-
inely binary. Indeed, in the experiments,the indifference point typically corresponded to lower juice
quantities (see Figure 1B). Thus the difference in neural activity
between easy decisions (dark blue in Figure 6A) and split deci-
sions (light blue in Figure 6A) could be explained if the activity
of chosen juice cells depended to some extent on the chosen
juice quantity. To address this issue, I isolated trials in which
the animal chose one drop of the preferred juice (1A), and I iden-
tified neurons encoding the chosen juice A. I then divided offer
types into easy and split and repeated the analysis (Figure 6C).
The results confirmed those based on all the trials: (1) the activity
recorded after the offer was significantly higher when decisions
were easy, (2) the traces did not seem to reach a specific
threshold, and (3) the activity recorded prior to the offer was
elevated in split-decision trials. Note that in Figure 6C, the cho-
sen option was identical for both traces, so differences in the
activity of chosen juice cells cannot be explained by quantity-
dependent encoding. Rather, all the differences between the
two traces seem genuinely related to the decision difficulty.
The relationship between the preoffer activity of chosen juice
cells and near-indifference decisions was also tested with a
logistic analysis. I constructed the following model:
choice E= 1=ð1+ eXÞ
X= a0 + a1 logð#E=#OÞ+ a2 4: (Equation 3)
For each chosen juice cell, 4 was the firing rate in the 500 ms
preceding the offer (in sp/s). Figure S5C illustrates the
Figure 5. Choice Variability Is Not Explained by Fluctuations of Offer Value Cells
(A) Population with positive encoding. The analysis focused on offer types where choices were split. For each offer type, trials were divided depending on the
animal’s choice (juice E or juice O) and the activity was averaged separately for the two groups of trials (R2 trials per trace). The resulting traces were averaged
across offer types for each cell and then across cells. The eventual choice of the animal does not correlate with fluctuations in the activity of offer value cells.
Average traces shown here are from 177 cells. The gray bar highlights the time window on which the ROC analysis was conducted (150–400 ms after the offer).
Inset: the histogram shows the distribution of AUC obtained across the population. The mean AUC was statistically indistinguishable from 0.5.
(B) Population with negative encoding. Same procedures as in (A). Average traces shown here are from 52 cells. Across the population, the AUC was indis-
tinguishable from 0.5.
See also Figure S2.
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of the distribution m = 0.005 was significantly >0 (p < 108, Wil-
coxon signed-rank test). In essence, this means that when the
preoffer activity of chosen juice cells increased by one spike
per second, the animal made its choice as though the quantity
of the encoded juice was multiplied by a factor ofz1.005.
In summary, these results suggest that near-indifference deci-
sions are partly driven by the initial state of the neuronal assem-
bly, which fluctuates on a trial-by-trial basis and is reflected in the
preoffer activity of chosen juice cells.
Residual Predictive Activity of Chosen Juice Cells
While discussing the predictive activity, one important caveat re-
lates to the presence of choice hysteresis. Indeed, previouswork
has found that reward-related activity in the OFC can outlast the
trial end (Simmons and Richmond, 2008). Thus on any given trial,
chosen juice cells might present some tail activity from the pre-
vious trial. Because of choice hysteresis, such tail activity would
appear as predictive activity for hard decisions. Indeed, referring
to Figure 6A, more ‘‘E chosen split’’ trials follow trials in which the
animal chose juice E, and more ‘‘O chosen split’’ trials follow tri-
als in which the animal chose juice O. To assess the relation
between choice hysteresis and predictive activity, I examined
whether the outcome of the previous trial affected the activity
of chosen juice cells (Figure S4). Consistent with previous re-
sults, the activity of chosen juice cells early in the trial was slightly
elevated after trials in which the animal chose juice E and slightly
depressed after trials in which the animal chose juice O. This tail
activity was in the same direction as, and thus confounded with,
the predictive activity.
Importantly, the two interpretations for the predictive activity
(tail activity from the previous trial or baseline fluctuation reflect-Ning a bias in the current choice) are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, predictive activity could in principle provide a neuronal
mechanism for choice hysteresis. In this respect, it is interesting
to assess whether predictive activity was entirely explained as
tail activity from the previous trial (H0) or, alternatively, whether
predictive activity also reflected additional sources of stochas-
ticity (H1). To examine this issue, I separated trials into three
groups depending on whether in the previous trial the animal
chose the juice encoded by the cell (E, trials), the other juice
offered (O, trials), or neither juice (X, trials). Because the
outcome of the previous trial was fixed, the presence of the
residual predictive activity (Figures S4B–S4E) provided evidence
in favor of H1. For a quantitative assessment of residual predic-
tive activity, I constructed the following logistic model:
choice E= 1=ð1+ eXÞ
X= a0 + a1 logð#E=#OÞ+ a2ðdn1;E  dn1;OÞ+ a3 4residual:
(Equation 4)
For each chosen juice cell, 4residual was the residual firing rate
remaining after the linear regression of the raw firing rate 4 onto
the variable (dn-1, E  dn-1, O). The null hypothesis corresponded
to a3/a1 = 0. Figure S5D illustrates the distribution for a3/a1 ob-
tained across the population. The median of the distribution
m = 0.002 was small but significantly >0 (p < 0.02, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test). In other words, trial-by-trial fluctuations in
the preoffer activity of chosen juice cells were significantly corre-
lated with the decision of the animal, even when the outcome of
the previous trials was controlled for.
In conclusion, predictive activity reflected additional sour-
ces of stochasticity above and beyond the tail activity from the
previous trial.euron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 1329
Figure 6. Activity Profiles of Chosen Juice
Cells
(A) All trials. Neurons from the two experiments
were rectified (see main text) and pooled. Trials
were divided depending on whether the animal
chose the juice encoded by the cell (juice E) or
the other juice (juice O) and on whether the de-
cisions were easy or split. Average traces shown
here are from the 257 cells for which I could
compute all four traces (R2 trials per trace). The
activity after the offer depended on the decision
difficulty but did not resemble a race-to-
threshold. In the 500 ms before the offer, the
activity for ‘‘E chosen split’’ trials was elevated
compared to that for ‘‘O chosen split’’ trials
(predictive activity).
(B) ROC analyses. Histograms show the results
obtained for the five comparisons indicated in (A)
and (C).
(C) Control for juice quantity. This analysis
focused on trials in which the animal chose one
drop of the preferred juice (1A). Trials were divided
into easy and split and average traces shown here
are from the 181 cells for which I could compute
both traces (R2 trials per trace). All the effects
described in (A) were also observed when the
quantity of the chosen juice was fixed.
See also Figures S3–S5.
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I now turn to chosen value cells (Figure 1D). To examine their ac-
tivity in relation to choice variability, I focusedon trials inwhich the
animals chose one drop of the preferred juice over various
amounts of the other juice (trials 1A< qB,where q is the quantity
of juice B offered). Themotivation for this analysis was as follows.
In principle, choice variability could ensue if the value of any
particular good fluctuated from trial to trial. If so, one would
expect that the activity of chosen value cells, conditioned on
the animal choosing 1A, would be enhancedwhen the alternative
offer ismoredesirable. To test this prediction, I dividedoffer types
into easy and split. Consistent with the prediction, the activity of
chosen value cells with positive encoding was clearly higher for
split decisions compared to easy decisions (Figure 7A). This ef-
fect, termed ‘‘activity overshooting,’’ was evident in the time win-
dow150–400msafter theoffer,whichcorresponds roughly to the
time period in which the decision was made.
To assess whether the activity overshooting was generally
measurable for individual cells, I performed an ROC analysis1330 Neuron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.focusing on the 150–400 ms after the
offer. For each cell, I identified trials in
which the animal chose 1A, and I divided
them into easy and split decisions.
Comparing the two distributions of firing
rates, I obtained a measure for the AUC
(Figure 7A, inset). In general, the AUC var-
ied substantially across cells. However,
the mean AUC for the population was
significantly above the null hypothesis
of 0.5 (mean AUC = 0.526, p < 104,
t test). In other words, individual cells typically presented an
activity overshooting.
The result illustrated in Figure 7A was very robust (Figure S6).
In a variant of this analysis, I divided the amount of juice B
offered into three segments. Confirming the first observation,
the activity of chosen value cells gradually varied as a function
of the quantity of juice B (Figure 7B). Restricting the analysis
to cells that were significantly tuned yielded similar results (Fig-
ure 7C). With respect to chosen value cells with negative encod-
ing, one would expect a higher firing rate for easy decisions
compared to split decisions. Focusing again on the 150–
400 ms after the offer, this prediction was qualitatively met (Fig-
ure 7D), although the difference in signal was rather small and
did not reach significance threshold (mean AUC was 0.485;
p = 0.08, t test). Restricting the analysis to significantly tuned
cells yielded similar results (mean AUC = 0.480; p = 0.12,
t test; Figure 7E). Hence it was not clear whether chosen value
cells with positive and negative encoding differed qualitatively
or, alternatively, whether the measure obtained for cells with
Figure 7. Activity Overshooting in Chosen Value Cells
(A) Population with positive encoding. The analysis included only trials in which the animal chose one drop of juice (e.g., juice A). Trials were divided into two
groups depending on whether the offer type was easy or split (see legend). Each trace represents the average activity profiles for positive encoding chosen value
cells. Averages were calculated including only cells for which I could compute both traces (R2 trials per trace). Cells from experiment 1 contributed to each
average with at most one trace (choices of 1A). However, some cells from experiment 2 contributed with two traces (choices of 1A or 1B). In total, each population
trace shown here is the average of 212 individual traces from 151 cells. The insert illustrates the results of the ROC analysis.
(B) Same analysis as in (A), splitting trials into three groups. In all cases, the animal chose 1A over qB, with variable q. The three groups of trials correspond to easy
decisions (dark blue), split decisions with q <mean(r) (orange) and split decisions with qRmean(r) (green). Each population trace is the average of 112 individual
traces from 90 cells.
(C) Same analysis as in (A) including only cells that were significantly tuned in the 150–400ms after the offer. Each population trace is the average of 156 individual
traces from 112 cells.
(D) Population with negative encoding. Each population trace is the average of 155 individual traces from 106 cells. Consistent with the hypothesis that the chosen
value fluctuated from trial to trial, the dark red line was slightly above the light red line in the 150–400 ms after the offer. However, the effect did not reach
significance threshold.
(E) Same analysis as in (D) including only cells that were significantly tuned in the 150–400 ms after the offer. Each population trace is the average of 91 individual
traces from 62 cells.
See also Figures S6 and S7.
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Neural Mechanisms of Economic Decisions in OFCnegative encoding was, for some reason, noisier. Thus, subse-
quent analyses of chosen value cells focused on the population
with positive encoding.
Interpreting the Activity Overshooting: the Relative
Value as a Stochastic Variable
Comparing the results for chosen value cells with those for
offer value cells may seem to present a puzzle. Consider theNanalyses illustrated in Figures 7A and S2E, respectively. Both
analyses focused on trials in which the animal chose 1A. In
both cases, the activity of neurons encoding the value of 1A
(as an offer value in Figure S2E and as a chosen value in Fig-
ure 7A) was analyzed as a function of the quantity of juice B.
The rationale for the two analyses was similar. However,
chosen value cells presented a robust overshooting, whereas
offer value cells showed no such effect. In other words, iteuron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 1331
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the activity of offer value cells. So how can the overshooting be
explained?
In the framework of Figure 3B, decisions depend on the sub-
jective value of each juice and on the ‘‘exchange rate’’ between
the two juices, referred to as the relative value (r). Given two
goods, r can change over relatively long periods of time, for
example due to changes in internal motivation (Padoa-Schioppa
and Assad, 2006). More subtly, r could fluctuate on a trial-
by-trial basis. Interestingly, stochastic fluctuations of r would
induce overshooting in the activity of chosen value cells similar
to that shown in Figure 7A. To appreciate this point, consider tri-
als in which the animal chose between juices A and B. If value
functions are linear, r is the quantity ratio that makes the animal
indifferent between the two juices:
VðAÞ= rVðBÞ: (Equation 5)
Assume now that r is a stochastic variable with given distri-
bution. The choice of the animal in any particular trial imposes
a constraint on the possible realizations of r in that trial.
Consider, for example, trials in which the monkey chose one
1A over qB (trials 1A < qB). Disregarding other sources of
choice variability, Equation 1 implies that r R q. Thus the
average r in trials 1A < qB increases as a function of q.
This variability will also be reflected in the activity of chosen
value cells. Furthermore, considering trials in which the animal
chose 1A, Equation 5 implies r = chosen value (in units of
juice B). In conclusion, if r fluctuates stochastically, the activity
of chosen value cells in trials 1A < qB increases as a func-
tion of q.
The activity overshooting of chosen value cells can thus
be explained by fluctuations of r. An alternative hypothesis
is that chosen value cells actually encode the total value.
However, a quantitative analysis found that the explanatory
power of chosen value corrected for fluctuations of r
was significantly higher than that of total value (p < 0.01,
Kruskal-Wallis test; Supplemental Experimental Procedures;
Figure S7).
In summary, evidence suggested that the activity over-
shooting observed in chosen value cells reflected trial-by-trial
fluctuations in r. If this is true, two neuronal phenomena
described here appear related to choice variability: predic-
tive activity of chosen juice cells and activity overshooting of
chosen value cells. One important question was whether these
phenomena were different manifestations of the same un-
derlying source of variability or, alternatively, whether activity
overshooting and predictive activity were mutually indepen-
dent. As a first step to examine this issue, I took advantage
of the fact that predictive activity was largely accounted for
by choice hysteresis, and I repeated the analysis of chosen
value cells while controlling for the outcome of the previous
trial. The results provided strong evidence that the activity over-
shooting was independent of choice hysteresis (Figure 8; Sup-
plement Experimental Procedures). In contrast, the relation
between the activity overshooting of chosen value cells and
the residual predictive activity of chosen juice cells remains to
be examined.1332 Neuron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.DISCUSSION
I presented five primary results, each of which bears comments.
(1) Variables offer value, chosen value, and chosen juicewere
encoded by different groups of neurons. The fact that
these variables are encoded categorically and by different
neurons appears rather significant and opens numerous
questions regarding, for example, the possible corre-
spondence between the three cell classes identified
here and morphologically defined cell types. Addressing
this and related issues is a primary goal for future
research.
(2) Trial-by-trial fluctuations in the activity of offer value cells
did not explain choice variability in near-indifference de-
cisions. Future work might revisit this issue with higher
statistical power (e.g., collecting a larger data set or
perhaps asking the animals to fixate individual offers).
But taking the current findings at face value, how might
this negative result be explained? Recent theoretical
work demonstrates that choice probabilities (CPs) 0.5
are proportional to the matrix product of noise correla-
tions by read-out weights (Haefner et al., 2013). In this
perspective, a distribution of CPs might be centered on
zero due to several possible reasons. First, read-out
weights could equal zero (in this case, offer value cells
do not contribute to the decision). However, CPs would
also be close to zero if noise correlations were very
small, or if noise correlations within and across groups
of cells encoding the offer value of different juices were
similar, or if different neurons had positive and negative
read-out weights. Starting from these considerations,
future research shall examine noise correlations in
the OFC.
(3) The activity of chosen juice cells after the offer depended
on the decision difficulty but did not resemble a race-to-
threshold. At the outset of the study, I traced an analogy
between chosen juice cells and neurons in LIP. The pre-
dictive activity found for chosen juice cells resembles
that observed in LIP (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001) and
thus supports this analogy. At the same time, the activity
profile of chosen juice cells after the offer differs qualita-
tively from that described for LIP (Roitman and Shadlen,
2002; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). Two observations
seem relevant to this discrepancy. First, the concept of
accumulation of evidence over time, which is central to
perceptual decisions (Gold and Shadlen, 2007), does
not equally apply to economic decisions. Indeed the
‘‘evidence’’ in economic decisions (i.e., offer values) is
immediately available, not delivered gradually over time.
Second, the steady-state activity of neurons in LIP during
standard perceptual decisionsmay partly encode amotor
plan (Andersen and Cui, 2009; Bisley andGoldberg, 2010)
as distinguished from the decision outcome. In contrast,
when decision outcomes and motor plans are dissoci-
ated, decision signals in LIP are transient and qualitatively
similar to those illustrated here for chosen juice cells
(Bennur and Gold, 2011).
Figure 8. The Overshooting of Chosen Value Cells Is Independent of Choice Hysteresis
(A) Analysis of chosen value cells restricted to A, trials. The insert illustrates the result of the ROC analysis performed in the 150–400 ms after the offer. All
conventions are as in Figure 7A. The activity overshooting observed in chosen value cells is independent of the outcome of the previous trial.
(B) Analysis of B, trials.
(C) Analysis of X, trials.
(D) Comparing the AUC obtained for A, trials and B, trials. Each data point represents one neuron. Across the population, the two measures of AUC were
significantly correlated (correlation = 0.22, p < 0.01). In other words, the AUC for any given cell was reproducible. However, the difference between the two
measures of AUC was statistically indistinguishable from zero (slanted histogram; p = 0.48, t test).
(E) Comparing the AUC obtained for A, trials and X, trials.
(F) Comparing the AUC obtained for B, trials and X, trials.
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Neural Mechanisms of Economic Decisions in OFC(4) Prior to the offer, chosen juice cells presented predictive
activity correlated with the upcoming decision. Previous
studies observed similar phenomena in other decision
tasks (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Williams et al.,
2003;Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009). One notable differ-
ence is that the predictive activity found here is largely
(but not entirely) related to the outcome of the previous
trial. Predictive activity might suggest that chosen juice
cells actively participate in the decision process. How-
ever, current results do not necessary imply this scenario.
Indeed, an equally valid hypothesis is that other neurons,
not yet identified, participate in or even determine theNeurdecision, and separately inform the activity of chosen
juice cells. In this latter scenario, the relation between
the predictive activity documented here and the deci-
sion would be correlational, not causal. Disambiguating
between these hypotheses will likely require different
technical approaches such as selective microstimulation.
(5) In a limited time window shortly after the offer, chosen
value cells presented an activity overshooting related to
the decision difficulty. The present analyses suggest
that the activity overshooting reflected stochastic fluctua-
tions in the relative value r. Under this interpretation, an
important question relates to how r is instantiated at theon 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 1333
Neuron
Neural Mechanisms of Economic Decisions in OFCneuronal level. In the framework of Figure 3B, r can be
thought of as akin to a ratio of synaptic efficacies. Future
work should examine this hypothesis in detail. At the
same time, the framework schematized in Figure 3B is
very general and compatible with a variety of possible ar-
chitectures (Bogacz et al., 2006). More specific hypothe-
ses with respect to the architecture might conceivably
provide additional or alternative interpretations for the
overshooting of chosen value cells.
Comparing Mechanisms for Economic and Perceptual
Decisions
It has often been hypothesized that the neural systems governing
economic and perceptual decisions share fundamental princi-
ples and core mechanisms (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Shadlen
et al., 2008; Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2012; Wang, 2008).
Upon a closer examination, the two neuronal systems do present
important similarities, but also clear differences. First, offer value
cells do not showconsistent choice probabilities, unlikeMTcells.
Second, the activity of chosen juice cells does not resemble a
race-to-threshold, unlike that of LIP cells (but see above). Third,
chosen value cells do not have an obvious analog in perceptual
decisions. Consequently, there is no known counterpart for
the activity overshooting. Fourth, the encoding of value in the
OFC undergoes range adaptation and, more generally, depends
on the behavioral context in ways that differ from those found in
MT (Kohn, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad, 2008). Last but not least, neuronal activity in the OFC is
nonspatial. In summary, economic decisions appear to involve
distinct neuronal mechanisms that cannot be simply equated
to those underlying perceptual decisions.
The hypothesis examined in the present study, namely that
good-based decisions take place within the OFC, differs from
a recently-proposed ‘‘attentional drift-diffusion model’’ (ADDM)
(Krajbich et al., 2010). According to the ADDM, subjects switch
their attention back and forth between the options and, at any
given time, a comparator increments a decision variable in favor
of the attended option. The comparator is thought to reside in the
dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). Few considerations are
in order. First, the relation between fixation patterns and choices
(Krajbich et al., 2010) may, at least in part, reflect a causal
relation opposite to that assumed in the ADDM. In other words,
subjects might tend to look longer at offers they are leaning
toward. Second, the evidence implicating dmPFC (Hare et al.,
2011) is based on analyses of aggregate data and builds on
assumptions that may not hold when neuronal responses are
heterogeneous. Third, according to the ADDM, neurons in the
OFC would encode not the chosen value per se, but rather the
variable chosen value  other value (Lim et al., 2011). However,
vanishingly few neurons were found to encode this variable
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; 2008). In summary, current
support for the ADDM is not conclusive. These considerations,
together with an established literature showing that lesions to
the OFC selectively impair value-based decisions, justify the
hypothesis examined in this study.
To conclude, I showed that three variables intimately related
to economic decisions—offer value, chosen value, and chosen
juice—are encoded by three distinct groups of neurons in the1334 Neuron 80, 1322–1336, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.OFC. My analyses suggest that choice variability may be driven
partly by the initial state of the neuronal assembly (revealed by
the predictive activity of chosen juice cells) and partly by sto-
chastic fluctuations in the relative value of the juices (revealed
by the activity overshooting of chosen value cells). Finally, this
study highlighted important analogies but also significant differ-
ences between the neuronal mechanisms of economic and
perceptual decisions.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Task Design and Preliminary Analyses
Data analyzed in this study are from two experiments (Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad, 2006, 2008). Procedures for behavioral control, neuronal recording,
and preliminary analyses have been described in detail. In both experiments,
trials started with the animal fixating the center of a computer monitor (Fig-
ure 1A). After 0.5 s, two sets of colored squares, representing the two offers,
appeared on the two sides of the fixation point. For each offer, the color rep-
resented the juice type and the number of squares represented the juice
amount. The animal maintained central fixation for a randomly variable delay
(1–2 s), after which the fixation point was extinguished and two saccade tar-
gets appeared by the offers (go signal). The animal indicated its choice with
a saccade and maintained peripheral fixation for 0.75 s before juice delivery.
Two animals, L and V, participated in each experiment. In experiment 1 (931
cells), animals chose in each session between two juices. In experiment 2
(557 cells), animals chose between three juices offered pairwise, and trials
with the three juice pairs were randomly interleaved.
An offer type was defined by two offers (e.g., [1A:3B]). Juice pairs and offer
types varied from session to session. Within a session, different offer types
were pseudo-randomly interleaved. Their frequency varied, but each offer
type was typically presented at least 20 times in each session. A trial type
was defined by an offer and a choice (e.g., [1A:3B,A]). The analysis presented
in the section, From Neuronal Responses to Cell Classes, and the subsequent
cell classification was based on four primary time windows: postoffer (0.5 s
after the offer), late delay (0.5–1 s after the offer), prejuice (0.5 s before juice
delivery), and postjuice (0.5 s after juice delivery). A neuronal response was
defined as the activity of one cell in one time window as a function of the trial
type. Task-related responses were identified with an ANOVA (factor trial type,
p < 0.001). Across experiments, 843/1,488 (57%) neurons were task-related in
at least one time window. Previous studies showed that variables offer value,
chosen value, and chosen juice explain the vast majority of task-related
responses. To classify responses, I performed a linear regression of each
task-related response on each variable. A variable was said to explain a
response if the regression slope differed significantly from zero (p < 0.05). If
a variable did not explain a response, R2 was set equal to zero. If more than
one variable explained one response, the response was assigned to the vari-
able with the highest R2. Across experiments, neurons encoding one of the
three variables in at least one time window were 783/1,488 (53%; 443 from
experiment 1; 340 from experiment 2).
Statistical Analyses
Several analyses presented in this Article were conducted by dividing trials into
two groups—easy and split. In all cases, split refers to offer types in which the
animal split its decisions between the two offers, conditioned on the fact that
the animal chose either option at least twice; easy refers to offer types in which
the animal consistently chose the same option. The label ‘‘easy’’ captures the
fact that these decisions were presumably easier. Restricting the analysis to
trials in which the animal chose one drop of juice A against variable quantities
q of juice B (1A< qB), easy/split also corresponds to low/high values of q.
All ROC analyses were done on row spike counts, without time averaging or
baseline correction. The details of the analysis, however, differed to some
extent depending on the neuronal population. For Figure 5A, I identified offer
types in which decisions were split. For each offer type, I divided trials into
two groups depending on the chosen juice (E or O). The two groups were
compared with an ROC, from which I measured the area under the curve
Neuron
Neural Mechanisms of Economic Decisions in OFC(AUC). This AUC is equivalent to the measure of choice probability defined for
perceptual decisions (Britten et al., 1996; Nienborg et al., 2012). To obtain a
single AUC for each neuron, I averaged the AUC across offer types (Kang
and Maunsell, 2012). The same procedure was used for Figure 5B. The results
reported in Figures 5A and 5B were obtained with an arithmetic average. How-
ever, the results obtained weighing the AUC obtained for each offer type with
the geometric mean of the two trial numbers (corresponding to choices of E
and O) were essentially identical. For Figure 6A, I identified offer types in which
decisions were split, and I divided trials into two groups depending on the cho-
sen juice (E or O). In this case, trials from different offer types were pooled and
compared with the ROC analysis. For Figures 6C and 7A, I focused on trials in
which the animal chose one drop of the preferred juice (1A). These trials were
divided into two groups depending on whether decisions with the correspond-
ing offer type were easy or split. The two groups of trials were compared
directly with the ROC analysis. The analyses illustrated in Figures 7C–7E,
S2A, and S2B were restricted to cells that were significantly tuned in the
150–400 ms following the offer. For each cell, tuning was established with
an ROC analysis of all trials, dividing them into tertiles of chosen value (as in
Figures 2A–2D), comparing the activity obtained for the ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’ ter-
tiles and requiring that the AUC differ significantly from 0.5 (p < 0.05).
For logistic analyses, data from experiment 2 were divided into three groups
corresponding to the three juice pairs. For simplicity, I refer to each of these
groups of trials as a ‘‘session.’’
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